An opposition to the demands of the European Union has long been a feature of continental politics. The refusal of membership by Norway and Switzerland, the rejection of an EU constitution by France and the Netherlands and the habitual wariness of Sweden and Denmark all testify to the widespread doubts about integrationism. Nevertheless, one nation has gained a special reputation for belligerence. After its initial unwillingness to join, Britain mounted staunch resistance to key areas of EU policy, from budget contributions to the Social Charter, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the single currency and the Schengen zone. The notion of Britain as a ‘reluctant European’ or ‘awkward partner’ was confirmed on 23 June 2016, when a referendum on membership, held after months of political bickering and scaremongering, led to a dramatic vote to leave. The result bore no relation to recent history. Most obviously, the marginality that Britain had often felt in Brussels belied its status as one of the largest member-states, with an equal highest share of the vote on the Council of Ministers and the second highest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. At the same time, the ‘Europeanisation’ of British political frameworks had been achieved with success: as Andrew Geddes remarks, ‘European integration [was] absorbed within the organizational and conceptual logics of British politics’ and ‘worked its way into institutional roles, party debate, policy-making, devolution and interest representation’. The inconsistent response to unification was repeated on the level of party politics. While political leaders had always favoured intergovernmentalism (the furthering of relations between sovereign governments) over supranationalism (the ceding of
sovereignty to an integrated federal government), there was no consensus on whether increased national autonomy or improved regional cooperation was the better option for managing globalisation, with both Labour and the Conservatives torn between integrationists and isolationists, pro-Marketeers and anti-Marketeers, Europhiles and Europhobes. As this essay will examine, the same ambivalence not only informed public debate in the latter half of the twentieth century, but also entered British fiction of the period, which struggled to develop ‘Project Europe’ as a literary motif.

The pattern of relations between Britain and the European Economic Community was established before the organisation began. British ambivalence was typified by Winston Churchill, who in the aftermath of the Second World War wanted to maintain Britain’s status as one of the ‘Big Three’ but also recognised the need for wider alliance. As early as 1946, the former Prime Minister spoke in Zurich of the need for ‘a kind of United States of Europe’ as a bulwark against Soviet aggression, and went on to expand the point at the 1948 Concert of Europe, when the notion of pooled sovereignty was debated. Yet a ‘United Europe’ was only one of the ‘three great circles’ in which Churchill positioned the nation: the British Empire and the ‘English speaking world’ were equally significant, and as Britain was ‘the only country which has a great part in every one of them’ its role was to draw the three together in a united crusade against communism. The idea was entirely compatible with British foreign policy. For the Labour government, Britain needed to retain its empire but also ensure that any political and economic cooperation in western Europe was led by Britain in order to maintain its standing with Washington, a belief that informed Ernest Bevin’s work on the Brussels Treaty, the Committee of European Economic Cooperation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The only stumbling block was Washington’s own aims for the region. Its calls for an integrated approach to government structures, security and trade seemed determined ‘to refashion Western Europe in the image of the United States’, ignoring Bevin’s allegiance to
Keynesian social policy and viewing Britain as a federal partner rather than a European leader.\textsuperscript{5} In the words of one novel from the era, here were plans to ‘demote this country from a world power to a sort of garden suburb of Europe’.\textsuperscript{6} Nevertheless, Labour resisted the pressure for federation, as did the Conservative administrations of the 1950s. Unwilling to commit itself to closer union, Britain watched from the sidelines as a number of western European nations, with full US support, ratified the European Coal and Steel Community, negotiated a European Defence Community and founded the European Economic Community. The tariff adjustments and free movements of capital and labour between the six signatories of the Treaty of Rome produced rapid economic growth, as well as greater standing in world affairs. In this context, Harold Macmillan’s decision in 1960 to negotiate UK membership was a gesture of defeat. The decision was profoundly unpopular with those who, like the leader of the Labour Party, saw this as ‘the end of Britain as an independent nation’ and who were openly relieved when British accession was vetoed by Charles de Gaulle in 1963.\textsuperscript{7} After Labour’s electoral victory in the following year, Harold Wilson remained sceptical about the EEC, foreseeing the imposition of ‘Euro-loaves’ and ‘Euro-beer’, but was driven by a faltering economy to submit a second application in 1967 (again vetoed by de Gaulle).\textsuperscript{8} Although Edward Heath finally led Britain into the EEC on 1 January 1973, the constitutional stipulations of the Treaty of Rome, particularly the demands of ‘an ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe’, were played down in public addresses, which aimed to reduce public alarm by highlighting the economic benefits of membership.\textsuperscript{9}

The official presentation of the EEC as a regional trading bloc, lacking any political design, persisted in the 1970s and 1980s, when the organisation was popularly known as the ‘Common Market’. Yet there was a growing sense of federalist ambition. After accession, Britain struggled to accept policies on which the other members had agreed, including fishing quotas, agricultural prices and budgetary and fiscal policies. At the same time, the government
was anxious about the public response to the economic slump of 1970s, when the Labour grassroots blamed inflation and unemployment on the ‘capitalist club’ of the EEC and voted against continued membership. It was partly to allay these concerns that Labour, now in power, held a referendum on membership in 1975. Although two-thirds of the electorate voted to remain, the result was less an expression of public enthusiasm than of a well-oiled government campaign that emphasised the dangers of departure.\(^{10}\) Indeed, in the polls taken between 1974 and 1982 the average support for membership was a mere 33 per cent, with opposition running at several points higher. During the Callaghan administration, the vehement Europhobia of much of the Labour Party was exacerbated by Britain’s high net contribution to the EEC budget, which in 1977-78 reached £540 million. The failures of the rebate mechanism became a *cause célèbre* once Thatcher took power in 1979. Marked by a fervent belief in national autonomy, Thatcher led a growing number of Conservatives who, though not averse to the EEC’s free market principles, were increasingly frustrated by the processes of joint decision-making. In a speech delivered at Bruges in 1988, Thatcher not only insisted on Britain’s special relationship to the US, but also mounted an attack on Brussels centralism: ‘We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain’, she intoned, ‘only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels’.\(^{11}\) By this stage, the Prime Minister was seen by many as a liability to the nation’s standing in the EEC: as novelists described it, Britain was now ‘the problem child of Europe’ and ‘the spoilsport in Europe’.\(^{12}\) The frustration was shared by the growing number of pro-Marketeers in the Tory cabinet, in the Liberal Democrats and even in sections of Labour, as well as by voters in Scotland and Wales, where economic devastation was so great that Brussels was seen as a useful check on Thatcherist excesses.

The Conservative reputation as ‘the party of Europe’, established by Heath in the 1960s, was further eroded in the 1990s. After the Tories won a fourth successive election in 1992,
John Major signed the Maastricht Treaty, helping to create the European Union and to initiate a new, dynamic stage of integration, when greater alliance was forged on home affairs, foreign policy, parliamentary procedure, security and citizenship. Although Major opted out of monetary union and the Social Chapter, Maastricht raised fears of a loss of autonomy in the ‘New Europe’, most obviously amongst the popular press, which peppered its coverage of an expensive, undemocratic superstate with ‘stories of some latest European threat – a proposal to outlaw flavoured crisps, undersized tomatoes, or the British oak’. The serious rifts within the Conservative camp facilitated the electoral success of Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’, a post-socialist party that took a pro-EU line partly as a way of countering the Tories and partly as a response to the fact that 60 per cent British trade was with the EU. Indeed, New Labour fell into line with the EU’s increasingly neoliberal response to the challenges of globalisation, allowing the inexorable spread of federalism that, by the turn of the century, had left few British institutions unaffected by EU policy. Nevertheless, the electorate had not developed any more interest in the subject, or any greater sense of Europeanness. The general lack of affinity with the single market is seen in the Eurobarometer polls on European identification across the member-states, with Britain’s average index score coming second last to Denmark. At the same time, the poor media coverage of events in the EU and the continuing refusal by the government to admit the creeping federalism of the times left the public notoriously ill-informed. The result of one survey in the 1970s, when respondents were asked to name the EEC members and suggested such countries as South Africa, Israel and Russia, would not have been unsurprising twenty-five years later. Even in the build-up to the 2016 referendum on ‘Brexit’ the perplexity remained, with one YouGov poll showing that the ‘undecided’ were half as many as the ‘remains’. In short, Britain still felt itself a peripheral island nation, unattached to ‘the unbroken landmass that is our Europe’, as one novelist called it, and loyal
to the ideal to British exceptionalism: that is, to ‘the loving exaggeration of every vestigial
British difference from the European pattern’.17

The failure to choose the EU as an object of allegiance was exhibited by almost all
British novelists during the latter half of the twentieth century. For political decisions of such
importance, the nation’s realignment from the Commonwealth to the Common Market and its
steady absorption of EU policy had little impact on literary styles, themes and political
sympathies. The ideological commitment to ‘Project Europe’ – often known as ‘Europism’ or
‘Europeanism’ – entails a loyalty to shared political institutions and a belief in shared cultural
practices, neither of which is evident in British fiction. On occasion, one finds references to
‘ancient European culture’ and to Britons as ‘modern inheritor[s] of European culture’, even
discussions of European culture as a romantic alternative to the materialism and inward-
looking nationalism that define ‘that cold little decrepit island off Europe’.18 But such attitudes
were rare, and the dominant approach supported Tony Judt’s argument that, ‘[w]ith certain
notable exceptions, British intellectuals did not play an influential part in the great debates of
continental Europe, but observed them from the sidelines’.19 This is not to say that British
novelists were parochial in outlook, an accusation often levelled against them. From the 1940s
onwards, writers showed a constant interest in global events and processes, including
espionage, nuclearism and superpower hegemony, as well as the impact of decolonisation, a
theme rapidly advanced by writers who migrated from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean in the
1940s and 1950s. The problem, rather, was that the Common Market was never as urgent as
Churchill’s other ‘great circles’, with US superpowerdom and the end of empire dominating
debate. At the same time, writers failed to distance themselves from popular attitudes to
western Europe. The common usage of ‘Europe’ and ‘the continent’ as categories distinct from
Britain, even categories against which Britishness is defined, had an equivalence in education,
where British History was taught separately to European History and where English Literature
eschewed literature in translation from the mainland, despite the acceptance on courses of American and postcolonial writing. The intellectual categories these practices created, and foreignness they projected onto neighbouring countries, hindered the development of ‘Project Europe’ as a political ideal and literary theme. Nevertheless, treatment of the topic was not entirely absent. As the present study seeks to show, British literary engagement from the 1950s to the turn of the millennium made steady, albeit tentative progress, shifting from lack of interest during the early years of the EEC to more pressing concern in the post-Maastricht period.

The intrinsic links between popular and literary attitudes to Europe were clear in the 1950s and 1960s, when general indifference prevailed. The urgent debates amongst political elites, whose envious recognition of the achievements of the EEC were balanced against doubts about the intentions of individual nations, particularly those of Germany, were largely lost on a population experiencing the end of rationing and the start of an economic boom. Interest certainly rose during Macmillan’s bid for membership, when the government’s propaganda campaign provoked Clement Attlee to publicly denounce western Europe as ‘politically unstable’, but apathy soon resurfaced.20 Although novelists addressed the emerging Cold War in Europe, most famously in Evelyn Waugh’s *Scott-King’s Modern Europe* (1946), George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) and Graham Greene’s *The Third Man* (1950), economic and political integration went largely unnoticed. The indifference towards western Europe is crystallised by the protagonist of Kingsley Amis’s *I Like It Here* (1958) who, flicking through Greene’s work before a trip to Portugal, considers it ‘[e]xtraordinary how the region kept coming up’.21 As Amis’s work illustrates, self-satisfied references to insularity were a staple of the British novel. Just as Amis chooses ‘Anglo-Saxon provincialism’ over ‘“international co-operation and friendship and all the rest of it”’, so a character in Bradbury’s *Stepping Westward* (1965) refuses identification with the continent: ‘I’m not European’, he insists, ‘I’m
English’. 22 Although characters are allowed sporadic holidays in neighbouring countries, these are rarely described in detail and have no consequence for narrative or theme. Indeed, the foreign holiday is used more as an indicator of a character’s social or economic status than as a basis for geopolitical discussion. Margaret Drabble, who satirised the parochialism of I Like It Here (‘As Kingsley Amis might put it, I am a nut case about abroad’), allows her characters sojourns in Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands, and even permits ‘quasi-essential trips to the continent’, but these speak less about the travelled environment than about the cultural cachet of the traveller. 23 Novelists even disparage the foreign locations which characters visit: a stay in Paris proves ‘a tedious torment’, a tour of Greece proves ‘disappointing’ and an anecdote about a holiday in Tuscany causes listeners a ‘mingling of incredulity and horror’. 24 The same lack of engagement is seen in narratives set wholly or partly on the European mainland. Works by Muriel Spark, Storm Jameson, Simon Raven and Lawrence Durrell, all of whom were more cosmopolitan in their choice of location, express a love of a particular country but say little about Britain’s relations to the mainland and nothing about the development of the EEC, which is barely referenced in the period. 25 In a novel from the 1960s, one of William Cooper’s narrators overhears a restaurant conversation about the Common Market and fails to see what all the fuss is about:

In January 1962 lots of people were disputing: will Britain get into it? Ought Britain to get into it? And so on. I’d bet that in 1972 those conversations reported in a novel will read as flat as the flat-earther’s earth. By then our country will either be in the Common Market, in which case everyone will have forgotten we were kept out. Or we shall have been permanently kept out, in which case everyone will have forgotten we tried to get in. Or the Common Market will no longer be in existence in its present form, anyway. 26
Marked by repetition, poor syntax and lazy phrasing, the passage certainly illustrates Cooper’s point that the EEC is unsuitable for fiction, indeed may even imply that its stylistic failures are the EEC’s fault. More incisive is the newspaper reporter in J.B. Priestley’s *The Shapes of Sleep* (1962). Asked to deliver two thousand words on ‘What Britons Are Thinking About the Common Market’, the reporter only manages eight: ‘Britons are not thinking about the Common Market’.\(^{27}\)

Nevertheless, the early 1960s saw the publication of two novels – Nancy Mitford’s *Don’t Tell Alfred* (1960) and Angus Wilson’s *The Old Men at the Zoo* (1961) – which allotted the topic more depth and seriousness. Mitford’s novel, published in the year that Macmillan opened talks on EEC membership, focuses on British relations to France, the target of Churchill’s plans for an Anglo-French Union in the early 1940s and of Bevin’s interest in intergovernmental cooperation later that decade. The narrative follows the fortunes of Lady Fanny Wincham after her husband is appointed British Ambassador to France and the two relocate from London to Paris. Deeply conservative in her politics, Mitford may be expected to use the narrative for patriotic purposes, especially considering her views on integration; writing in the *Sunday Times* in 1952, she was adamant that ‘non-co-operation’ was Britain’s proper strategy and that ‘it is impossible for us to join any sort of federation’.\(^{28}\) The emphasis on national autonomy appears in earlier sections of the text where Fanny not only dreams that her husband will ‘become one of those plenipotentiaries whose names are ever remembered with gratitude and respect’, but is also delighted to find the British Embassy cut off from the city around, forming ‘a haven of delight’ that ‘has more the atmosphere of a country than a town house’.\(^{29}\) In this ‘little England’, Fanny is able to display all the characteristics of aristocratic Englishness – fortitude, respectability, patriotism – and to take amused digs at French society, especially at the parliamentary crises that plagued de Gaulle’s Fourth Republic. Yet Mitford is under no illusions about the fragility of the old order. On the one hand, the novel charts the levelling out
of social hierarchies and the rise of mass culture, with even Fanny’s sons turning to youth fashions and eastern mysticism. On the other hand, there are the geopolitical dangers of an expansionist Soviet Union, a resurgent America and a host of assertive third world countries intent on independence (which Fanny dismisses as ‘improbable lands’) (46). It is in the face of these threats that the novel starts to advocate greater cooperation between western European governments. Alluding to the Anglo-French Union, one character argues that the “‘Entente’” of the Second World War, when Britain and France were “‘allies in love with each other’”, is just as essential now that Europe is “‘running into choppy seas’” (22, 22-3, 23). During luncheons with the French foreign minister (with whom Fanny ‘felt natural and at ease’), conversation ranges through such topics as a European market and European Army, a development “‘desired by the Americans’” but unpalatable to British and French diplomats who prefer western Europe to be “‘built up on a more peaceful and workable foundation’” (61, 63, 64). The consequences of failure are dramatized in an Anglo-French territorial dispute about an island chain off the French coast. Despite the islands lacking economic or strategic significance, the dispute causes antagonism between the two national populations, aggravated by the British press, which accuses France of ‘refusing to make a united Europe’ (193). The French foreign minister may insist on possession to please the domestic audience, but is aware of the need for western European unity in face of mounting Cold War tensions:

‘This is a moment in the history of the world when brains are needed more than anything else. If we don’t produce them in Western Europe where will they come from? Not from America where a school is a large, light building with a swimming pool. Nor from Russia where they are too earnest to see the wood from the trees. […] If the children of our old civilization don’t develop as they ought to, the world will indeed become a dangerous playground.’ (111)
By this stage, the novel starts to read like a Europeanist tract. The impression is supported by Mitford’s attack on Europhobes and her questioning of British Atlanticism, seen in her censure of Westminster’s plans “to get those bloody islands and to help the Americans re-arm the Germans” (185). Indicating that a British bias remains, Mitford makes sure the verdict on the islands favours British ownership, but in having that verdict delivered at the International Court of Justice she shows support for embryonic pan-European institutions. Such support does not extend to ‘any sort of federation’, however. Echoing the views of Macmillan, her portrait of the bond between British and French diplomats and her nostalgia for the wartime alliance argue for intergovernmental cooperation rather than a western European superstate, in spite of the common claim that Churchill’s Anglo-French Union ‘marked the beginning of a United States of Europe’.30 In another link to Macmillan’s policies, the novel not only urges participation at an early stage, but also encourages Britain to take the lead, a strategy which does not mean a sacrifice of the kind of Englishness that Fanny and her husband represent. In the words of a French character, one can “live and die a European” while still appreciating the fact that “every country […] had its own architecture and customs and food” (149, 148). Although the novel shows limited commitment to Europeanism, it was a huge advance on other fiction of the period, as shown by the second novel to treat the EEC in more detail. Wilson’s The Old Men at the Zoo, a dystopian account of a western European military attack on Britain, has no particular sympathy for the Common Market, nor interest in its political and economic policies, none of which are specified in the text.

The general disinterest in integration continued to inform British fiction of the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that slightly more novels were set on the mainland might have been a result of EEC accession, although might equally have resulted from the rise of mass tourism to the Mediterranean (as one of Elizabeth Taylor’s novels points out, ‘every single person in the British Isles would soon be taking his (sic) holidays abroad’).31 Either way, the primary form
of engagement was through allusion to characters’ holidays ‘on the continent’, which remained shorn of any discussion of Europeanness or expression of Europeanist ideals. An example is Anita Brookner’s fiction of the 1980s, which sends characters on trips to Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, France and Greece, but refuses to allow the narrative to follow them, apart from in *Hotel du Lac* (1984), although even this tale of English tourists in Geneva admits non-British characters only as backdrop. The novel reveals some of the benefits of a western European setting, including the faint air of exoticism that the setting provides and the dramatic potential of a group of characters isolated from domestic society, a technique also used by Pamela Hansford Johnson, Angela Carter, Ian McEwan and Barry Unsworth. Yet these failed to provide a detailed study of the chosen country and often featured characters so averse to their surroundings that one senses a similar aversion on the part of the author. That vacationing on the mainland could reinforce prejudices rather than overcome them is shown by how characters spend much of their time faced with ‘trivial things’, plagued by ‘spiritual emptiness’ and tormented by ‘tiredness and boredom’. In Penelope Lively’s *According to Mark* (1984), one of the protagonists disembarks from a ferry in France and, overcome by ‘the smell of abroad’, evokes western Europe as a degraded, homogenous mass:

Goodness knows of what [the smell] is composed: cigarettes and rubbish and petrol and food or perhaps it just came smoking out of the ground. She would have known it anywhere; this was France smell, but there was also, for her, Greece smell and Italy smell and Spain smell and each summoned separate and on the whole disagreeable sensations.

The ‘quiet xenophobia’ charted by Lively is occasionally directed by authors at the institutions of the EEC, which were viewed with greater hostility after 1973. According to a poll conducted in 1970, support for membership was running at 23 per cent and, although the figure rose at the time of accession (a result of another propaganda campaign by the government), it
returned to deplorably low levels for the rest of the 1970s and 1980s. Inevitably, direct criticism of the EEC now entered British fiction, although this was never anything more than cursory. For example, Margaret Drabble mentions graffiti that says ‘BRITAIN OUT OF THE EEC’ and J.L. Carr describes how EEC membership would do away with ‘the more archaic land measurements such as roods, poles and perches’, but neither author deigns to discuss the topic any further.36 When Fay Weldon refers to ‘unreasonable EEC regulations’ or Lively mentions ‘Britain’s position vis-à-vis the European monetary fund’ nothing is communicated about these complex processes apart from a vague sense of threat.37 Similarly, no evidence is presented for authors’ brief criticisms of ‘high Common Market prices’, of an ‘EEC […] government of bureaucrats’, of ‘the European Economic Community[‘s] beef mountain’ and of ‘some common Market incentive [that] encouraged the farmers to sow every available acre with rape’.38 Even Alexander Cordell’s If You Believe the Soldiers (1973), which ends with an EEC invasion of Britain reminiscent of Wilson’s The Old Men at the Zoo, offers no information about the politics of the invading superstate. It is no surprise, given all this, that Britain’s entry into the Common Market passes with barely a mention in the entire corpus of British fiction. An account of the parliamentary debate on entry appears in C.P. Snow’s In Their Wisdom (1974), but seems to hold as little interest for the author as it did for Cooper before him, being summarised, dismissively, as ‘sober, practical, sometimes qualified’.39 In the light of the literary landscape of the period, characters’ comments in other novels that ‘[w]e’re not all pro-EC yet’” and that “‘Britain’s still good enough for me’” seem considerable understatements.40

Only a few novels published during the 1970s and 1980s approached the topic in greater detail. An example from the literary right was The Commissioner (1987) by Stanley Johnson, a former Conservative MEP and father of Boris Johnson, one of the leaders of the ‘Brexit’ campaign in 2016. The central character, forty-eight-year-old James Morton, is a Conservative Party stalwart whose ambitions for high office are dashed when Thatcher appoints him
European Commissioner in Brussels, generally viewed as “a cul-de-sac post” in “a political backwater.” True to history, Johnson depicts a party that resolutely opposes “Brussels bureaucrats” and their refusal to adhere to ‘old-fashioned diplomacy […] between sovereign states’: as one of Morton’s associates insists, “competition is one thing, but bloody-minded interference is something else altogether” (19, 30, 19). Yet the more talk there is of the continent ‘heading for a United States of Europe’, the more Morton realises that ‘Brussels was a place where a man could make a name for himself’ (29, 28). This dual interest in personal and national gain is clear when he travels to Belgium to take up his new post. For Morton, it is no small irony that the President of the European Commission is a former commander in the German army, or that the President’s first briefing session focuses ‘on how he proposed to run Europe’ (44). The way that Dr Horst Kramer defines the European Commissioners ‘not as delegates of our individual states, but as servants of the European ideal’, is not unacceptable to Morton, but he bristles when Kramer gives him the portfolio for industry, a relatively minor position (50). Paradoxically, the portfolio allows him both to advance his career and to challenge German supremacy. This begins when he learns that Kramer has connections to the shadowy head of a chemical company, Ludwig Ritter, the “boss of the bosses” in German industry and a man of considerable political influence (60). Morton’s suspicions deepen when he discovers that the EEC fails to regulate chemical companies, which not only control a large percentage of the world’s drug and pesticide sales, but also export outlawed products to the third world, causing thousands of deaths a year. Shocked at the findings, Morton’s investigation leads directly to Deutsch-Chemie, Ludwig Ritter’s firm, which emerged from the cluster of German industries that the Allies dismantled after World War Two. Although Kramer attempts to block any further investigation, a spillage from one of Deutsch-Chemie’s plants, which releases deadly chemicals into the Rhine and threatens to pollute a large section of the European river network, lands the firm in the European Court of Justice. After finding against Deutsch-
Chemie, the court issues a personal commendation to Morton for his work on the case, one that promises promotion to President of the Commission. Published shortly after the ratification of the Single European Act, Johnson’s thriller may disagree with those Conservatives seeking British withdrawal from supranational institutions, but fully supports the major tenets of Conservative policy from the 1940s: that the EEC requires British leadership, that membership threatens national sovereignty and that Germany is intent on continental dominance. Nor does the investigation into Deutsch-Chemie question the EEC’s adherence to free-market capitalism, merely suggesting that industries on the mainland (or ‘over here in Europe’, as Morton phrases it) need to be subject to greater regulation (46).

The British left would have found little to agree with in Johnson’s screed, had they bothered to read it. As mentioned, the Common Market had been under attack from the Labour Party, the unions and the socialist grassroots since the 1950s, with few trusting Brussels on issues of public ownership, workers’ rights or welfare. Tony Benn crystallised the position when he denounced Britain’s position on ‘a federal escalator, moving [towards] a European coalition government that we cannot change, dedicated to a capitalist or market economy theology’. ⁴² In fiction, the left-wing perspective appeared in Jack Lindsay’s call for “a spirit of proletarian internationalism” across Europe, in Barry Hines’s suspicion that British ‘industry was being deliberately run down’ by EEC directives and in Raymond Williams’s portrait of a shadowy multinational – Anglo-Belgium Community Developments – that creates urban conurbations in rural Wales entirely for corporate profit. ⁴³ The most prolific opposition to the single market came in the work of John Berger. Over the course of four decades, Berger offered a sustained meditation on the continental theme, moving from European political upheaval in A Painter of Our Time (1958), through the dream of pan-European unity in Corker’s Freedom (1964) to the possibilities of European-wide revolution in G. (1972). In the 1970s, he began a series of novels that addressed the threats faced by the European peasantry,
a class whose labour had always been appropriated by the ruling order and which, after the
1950s, was finding its remaining autonomy curtailed by Brussels: ‘[t]he economic planners of
the EEC’, Berger writes, ‘envisage the systematic elimination of the peasant by the end of this
century’.44 In order to understand the motive, Berger settled in a small rural community in
eastern France to live and work, producing from his experiences the short stories, poems and
autobiographical reflections collected in Pig Earth (1979). Unsentimental in approach, the text
commends the preservation of a pan-European culture of rural craft and custom while also
acknowledging the endless struggle required ‘to produce the minimum of what we needed to
feed and clothe and warm us for the whole year’.45 The use of the collective ‘we’ indicates the
author’s values. The strength of the village’s collectivism is seen in the ease with which Berger
is accepted by inhabitants, who are always ready ‘to offer […] information, aid, protection’.46
At the same time, their commitment to collective labour suggests a ‘peasant ideal of equality
[that] recognizes a world of scarcity’ and that promises both a ‘fraternal aid in struggling
against this scarcity and a just sharing of what the work produces’.47 As importantly, the known
communities of the countryside retain an oral tradition that has been lost in urban European
society, allowing them to evade identification with the dominant order through the act of self-
representation:

What distinguishes the life of a village is that it is also a living portrait of itself: a communal
portrait, in that everybody is portrayed and everybody portrays. […] Every villager’s
portrait of itself is constructed […] out of words, spoken and remembered: out of opinions,
stories, eye-witness reports, legends, comments and hearsay. And it is a continuous
portrait; work on it never stops.48

While Berger accepts that peasant economics are not akin to communism, which is progressive
in sentiment, he refuses to believe that the peasantry is a force for conservatism. Any tendency
towards traditional social and economic arrangements is justified by the direct challenge they present to the organising principles of corporate capitalism: as Berger writes, ‘[a]n intact peasantry was the only class with an in-built resistance to consumerism. When a peasantry is dispersed, markets are enlarged’. It is this resistance that explains the EEC’s urge for destruction. Under the guise of ‘modernisation’, Brussels is bringing the countryside under metropolitan control through a mechanisation of production and a specialisation of the market, increasing the economic plight of the countryside and the economic pull of the cities. ‘Their job is to wipe us out’, one character laments: ‘On the plains there will be no more peasants’. Although focused on the specific conditions of provincial France, *Pig Earth* speaks metonymically of the financialisation of agriculture elsewhere in western Europe, as it does of collectivisation in eastern Europe, where rural life was also subject to centralised planning. In this way, the text’s notion of Europe, which reiterates Lindsay’s socialist internationalism, is much wider than that found in mainstream fiction, which tended to repeat the strict separation of East and West that informed governmental containment policy.

Berger’s anxieties about ‘Project Europe’ became more common in British fiction after Maastricht, which initiated the processes of post-Cold War unification. It is true that quick reference to holidays or business trips to the mainland, interspersed with laments about ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ and swipes at ‘Euro-fraud’, ‘Euro-speak’ and ‘conspiratorial Euro-imaginings’, continued to dominate literary treatments of integration. But more complex responses not only rose in number, with as many published in the 1990s as the last four decades put together, but also began to fall into distinct generic categories. The first to emerge was a reformulated containment fiction, a literary style which, still informed by Cold War attitudes, evoked a civilizational divide along the former line of the Iron Curtain. Focusing on south-east Europe, Julian Barnes, Malcolm Bradbury, Bel Mooney, Alan Brownjohn, Pat Barker and Louis de Bernières considered the region an ‘impossible hellhole’ and ascribed to
its inhabitants ‘a very great evil’ that ‘takes the logic and humanity out of their souls’.

Such claims worked to endorse the eastward expansion of the EU: when Bradbury recounts the
danger of a borderless continent in which migrants move westward ‘as if frontiers were
abolished’ and ‘the East-West divide […] had never been there’, he offers tacit support for EU
control of eastern Europe, despite his misgivings about this “complicated mega-country”.

The same paranoia informed a series of right-wing dystopias that emerged from the mid-1990s.
Echoing the cautionary tales of Wilson and Cordell, Andrew Roberts’s *The Aachen
Memorandum* (1995) and Terry Palmer’s *Euroslavia* (1997) mirrored Conservative calls for
greater isolationism, and even a novel by Julian Barnes, a longstanding Europhile, depicted an
EU intent on destroying ‘a nation which had once contested the primacy of the continent’.

In Roberts’s *The Aachen Memorandum*, the EU is so opposed national cultures that Kingsley
Amis is on a list of discouraged writers and literary scholarship is reduced to such
propagandistic tomes as *Shakespeare the Euro-Poet* and *European Scenes from Dickens*.

Another strand of fiction, however, presented a more reasoned study of British and European
identities. Addressing the cosmopolitan nature of ‘New Europe’, Trezza Azzopardi’s *The
Hiding Place* (2000) explored the multiethnicity consequent on migration between EU
countries, while Bernardine Evaristo’s *Soul Tourists* (2005) was soon examining the historical
presence in Europe of African and African-Caribbean diasporas, challenging notions of
national and continental exclusivity.

probed “the European ideal […] of mass society rather than homeland” and J.G. Ballard’s
*Cocaine Nights* (1996) and *Super-Cannes* (2000) explored the creation of “crime-free
enclaves” for the ‘Euro-corporate lifestyle’ of a wealthy elite.
An openly left-wing response to the European Union came in Elizabeth Wilson’s *The Lost Time Café* (1993), a dystopian thriller set at the millennium’s end, when the implications of Maastricht were becoming evident. The first-person narrator, Justine Unwin, has been enjoying a hedonistic life in California when she is called back to Britain by the death of her father, a leading light of the Communist Party. In her absence, the country has been taken over by a right-wing government steeped in Europeanist ideals. The currency is the ‘écu’, the centre of cultural life is ‘the European Institute’, the media is dominated by ‘negotiations in Europe’ and the rising star of British politics is a ‘Brussels-nurtured *bon vivant*’. Moreover, the neoliberal government’s commitment to privatisation, securitisation and de-welfarisation has had an inevitable impact on social well-being. For all its futuristic architecture of ‘silver towers’ and ‘black glass’, the capital is marked by such appalling levels of homelessness, poverty and crime that ‘New Europe’ looks a lot like ‘a new Dark Ages’ (6, 78, 15). Compounding the crisis is a terrorist faction within the Patriotic Party, an alliance of ‘anti-Federal Europeans’ that pursues its aim of ‘Home Rule for the Albion Nation’ via a bombing campaign on the capital, which further aggravates a political system ‘that wasn’t quite fascism but had ceased to be democracy’ (76, 77, 78). The full extent of the crisis becomes clear when Justine begins to investigate her father’s death and stumbles upon an investment scandal that leads directly to the Minister of the Interior. Despite his public image as an urbane, aristocratic Englishman, Alex Kingdom is a former Lithuanian blackmarketeer who, after killing an American soldier during the Second World War, relocated to Britain and made a fortune from speculating on bombed-out real estate. The historical and geographical extent of his activities (which include secretly funding the terrorist group in order to gain electoral support by publicly opposing it) indicates a continent-wide corruption in which Britain is implicated. Like McEwan before her, Wilson evokes modern European history as a continuum of evil, but one now linked to corporate capitalism. This is expressed by one of Justine’s left-wing contacts who, in
conversation with a disgraced secret service agent, learns about “a whole shadowy web of secret connections” that spans the continent:

‘I used to feel, when he told me things, it was like a curtain, and behind the curtain there was a byzantine underworld of intrigue and manipulation. It was a world that no one in the end controlled, it just ran of its own volition, reproduced itself, pulsating in the dark like some rogue bacterial culture in history’s boiler room, like something in a horror movie.’ (123)

A second hidden history emerges when Justine sorts through her father papers and finds a memoir of his work for the labour movement, one that offers ‘a monument to the memory of Communism’ (62). At this point, Justine recalls her own childhood conviction that left-wing politics are the only solution to the injustices of capitalism, a conviction summed up by her father’s mantra: “Socialism or barbarism; there’s no third way” (61). With a sense of radicalism returning, she becomes interested in the many leftist organisations operating in the capital, all of which seek to overthrow the government and the wider European order. The fact that Justine finally rejects involvement in favour of a return to the individualism of her life in California is an acknowledgement by Wilson, a former member of the CPGB, that there is no easy return to progressive politics after the collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’; indeed, the defeat of the labour movement in the 1990s was so extensive that ‘there was not even a language in which to talk about socialism, much less something as insane as revolution’ (64). The point echoes Couze Venn’s argument that the devastations of neoliberalism stem from the loss of any immediate political challenge: ‘[t]he end of the Cold War/Third World War has released capitalism from needing to respond to calls for responsibility […]. It has lost the ability to respond to suffering’. As Wilson insists, however, there remain alternative models for
political Europe, not least the solidarity, social justice and political and economic egalitarianism that Donald Sassoon terms the ‘socialist rationale of Europeanism’. 

Another example of the more detailed response to integration is Tim Parks’s *Europa* (1997), the most thorough literary study of British Euroscepticism in the period. Set in the early 1990s, the novel is narrated by Jerry Marlow, a British lecturer at the University of Milan, who finds himself embroiled in departmental protest about foreign lectors being denied the employment rights of native-born staff. It is with mixed feelings that he joins a delegation of staff and students on a coach journey to present a petition to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Marlow is not only unsure of the validity of their case, but also has doubts about the Parliament itself. Despite the Europeanism of others on the coach, who believe that ‘a united Europe is our only hope for the future’, he is ambivalent about the EU, reminding himself that this is ‘an institution which […] not only do you not support, nor subscribe to in any way, but which you frequently feel perhaps should not exist at all’. Marlow is aware of the historical development of political Europe from Ancient Greece, through Christendom, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution to the ‘visionary architects of our United Europe’, but refuses to show loyalty to an organisation ‘whose exact functions and powers and suffrage none of us understands’ (189, 21). His scepticism is expressed in the customary digs at ‘Eurobooze’, ‘Euro-architecture’ and ‘Euro-solidarity’, but also in general doubts about the existence of a definable continent, the coach trip stimulating reflections on ‘this Europe that may or may not exist’ and ‘whose precise border have never been clear’ (129, 55, 81, 26, 34). Such doubts are justified as soon as the coach enters Switzerland. Alongside the disintegration of relations amongst the multinational staff, a mix of Spaniards, Germans, Britons, Greeks, French and Irish, is the appearance of a country whose ‘admirable example of the possibility of federal coexistence between different ethnic groupings is ironically not part of that Europe to which we are appealing’ (36). Yet Marlow is not prepared for the events that occur in
Strasbourg. While the lectors are waiting to meet the Petitions Commission, the Parliament is embroiled in an emergency debate about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, or more precisely about ‘the conflict over Community policy towards Yugoslavia’ (193). For an organisation that was established to prevent further intra-European warfare after World War Two, the EU’s failure to agree on a response to Serb aggression in Bosnia, and the consequent failure to intervene, was viewed by many as an abandonment of European ‘civilisation’. The significance of the conflict is clear when the lectors finally meet the Commission. Aware that it has just been hearing a petition against the genocide, Marlow attempts to amplify their case through comparison, arguing that they have experienced ‘an infinitely milder form of the same thing: the desire by one group […] to deny full rights and privileges of citizenship, European Citizenship, to another group’ (219-20). The scene suggests that the most damaging effects of EU policy have not been on a disempowered western electorate but on a non-member-state denied even the most basic forms of justice. Yet the suggestion vanishes once the scene ends, with no further exposition of the crisis in Bosnia and no news about the Parliament’s decision on the genocide (apart from the extra-textual knowledge that it was allowed to continue for three-and-a-half years). In this way, the ideal of pan-European solidarity is not so much a conscious message on part of the author than an interpretation of a novel that relegates Bosnia (and other parts of eastern Europe) to the textual and geographical margins. Indeed, in the final scenes of Europa, the only socialist member of the delegation commits suicide, suggesting that social justice is as unlikely to emerge in modern Europe as the economic justice sought in Wilson’s The Lost Time Café.

The 1990s, in short, witnessed a British fiction keen to examine ‘Project Europe’ but unable to express either political support or political alternatives. The increased engagement was caused by the greater presence of the EU in British public debate and by the greater awareness that Britain could no longer retreat into ‘splendid isolation’, as Lord Salisbury once
termed it. When authors referred to ‘Kent pointing its finger […] at the Continent in warning’, to Britain as ‘a little hunched up old lady at the seaside, her back turned towards the rest of Europe’ or to a right-wing patriot as an ‘“whitecliffsdover piesmash jellyeels royalvariety british bulldog”’, there was no longer any sense that British nationalism was being endorsed.\textsuperscript{62} In more recent times, the publication of Ali Smith’s \textit{Autumn} (2016), a sober analysis of post-‘Brexit’ Britain, may herald a fuller engagement with the EU, although twenty-first century writing has not yet departed from the indifference and hostility that characterised earlier literary periods.\textsuperscript{63} Indeed, in the years leading up to ‘Brexit’ the government’s calls for a repatriation of social and economic policy after the credit crunch of 2008, not to mention its grievances over immigration, indicated a public sphere still ill-disposed to supranationalism. As Vernon Bogdanor points out, for Britain ‘to become genuinely European […] would require not only the victory of the pro-Europeans in Westminster, but also a genuine shift in the consciousness of the British people; and of that there is, as yet, no sign’.\textsuperscript{64} The literary output of the latter half of the twentieth century was a product of that entrenched consciousness, resistant to the Europeanness that the EU was attempting to nurture through continent-wide culture-building exercises and reflective of a society that had the lowest circulation of literature in translation of any European nation and one of the smallest modern language syllabi in secondary and higher education. When considered against the EU’s larger member-states, Britain may not be ‘unique in having a continuing aversion or scepticism towards integration’, as Simon Bulmer has argued, but is certainly unique in its literary disinterest in the continent of which it is a part.\textsuperscript{65}
ENDNOTES


7 Hugh Gaitskell quoted in May, *Britain*, p. 35.


13 May, *Britain*, p. 92.


15 See Jones, *Britain*, pp. 147-8.


53 Bradbury, *Doctor Criminale*, pp. 33, 33, 294.


56 The novel reinforces Caryl Phillips argument that ‘Europe must begin to restructure the tissue of lies that continues to be taught and digested at school and at home for we, black people, are an inextricable part of this small continent’ (Phillips, *The European Tribe* (1987; London and Boston, 1988), p. 129).


64 Bogdanor, ‘Footfalls Echoing in the Memory’, p. 701.