The meaning of ‘moving on’: From trauma to the history and memory of emotions in ‘post-conflict’ Northern Ireland

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‘Trauma’ has become established as a pervasive trope in discourse and practice concerned with the affective legacies of the Northern Ireland Troubles, providing a popular as well as a critical framework for understanding the effects of political violence during the conflict and memories of that violence during the peace process. The concept has proved highly productive in identifying the problem of the past in Ireland as a painful and troubling history that remains unresolved in the present and requires acknowledgement and redress. It has also generated new kinds of cultural and psychosocial analysis, encouraging engagement with questions of feeling and affective states marked by pain, distress and disturbance. However, I argue in this article that its productivity may have become exhausted as the concept itself congeals into normativity, whether homogenised as the trace of an unspeakable wound or medicalised as ‘PTSD’ (post-traumatic stress disorder). Placing emphasis on psychic entrapment within states of affect derived from experiences ‘in the past’, ‘trauma’ is open to accusations of being backwards-looking rather than illuminating the possibilities and means of transformation in subjectivities shaped by experiences and memories of violent conflict – or of conceiving such transformation in the questionable language of ‘healing’, ‘closure’ and ‘moving on’.

In the first part of this article, I draw on existing critical studies to identify a number of problematic assumptions within now-orthodox understandings of trauma promoted in what has become known as ‘trauma theory’ in the Humanities, and in the therapeutic culture centred on the treatment of PTSD. The analysis here focuses on the constraining effects of these understandings in three areas of debate and practice concerned with legacies and memories of the Troubles, namely academic studies of history and memory, victims’ support, and storytelling conceived as an aspect of peacebuilding. In the second part, I make a case for shifting the frame for investigation of subjective experiences and ‘psychological’ legacies of the conflict, away from trauma and towards the history and memory of emotions. Here I identify critical resources in theory and history that enable interesting alternative conceptions of the internal world of embodied feelings and the meanings ascribed to them, that recognize the complex temporalities of emotional experience and that explore the
shifting modes of management and containment, expression and performance of emotions within social and political relations and practices. Focusing on object-relations psychoanalysis, Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism, and the emerging field of emotional history, I tease out key concepts and insights with the potential to inform new ways of thinking about the affective legacies of the Irish conflict and the possibilities of their transformation – of ‘moving on’ – in ‘post-conflict’ Northern Ireland.

The trouble with trauma
In an essay problematising what she calls ‘the apparently oxymoronic “popularity” of trauma’ in academic debate in the Humanities, Susannah Radstone traces ‘the rise of what is becoming almost a new theoretical orthodoxy’; that of ‘trauma theory’ as articulated in seminal and widely cited texts by Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub. Subjecting this body of work to wide-ranging critical analysis, Radstone begins by contextualising its origins and founding assumptions as a marriage between theories of representation and subjectivity developed in deconstruction, post-structuralism and psychoanalysis, on one hand, and ‘(mainly US-based) clinical work with survivors of experiences designated as traumatic’, including the Vietnam War, the Holocaust, and sexual abuse, on the other. This clinical work is itself informed by the diagnostic categorisation of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), one of various ‘mental conditions and disabilities’ recognised (since 1980) by the American Psychiatric Association (APA); and also by a ‘neuroscientific approach to memory disorders’. According to the APA’s widely cited definition, PTSD is diagnosed on the basis of psychological and somatic symptoms produced in response to ‘an event out of the range of ordinary human experience in which one’s life or the lives of one’s family are endangered’, generating overwhelming feelings of helplessness and fear. The shocking, wounding event is considered to be ‘unassimilable or unknowable’ by the conscious mind and to give rise to a ‘dissociation’ from the self of its traumatic experience, which ‘comes to occupy a specially designated area of the mind that precludes (its) retrieval’ in memory. This idea meshes with the argument made in neuroscience, that ‘the traumatic event is encoded in the brain in a different way from ordinary memory’. Leaving gaps without trace in memory, the ‘unexperienced’ trauma manifests subsequently in recurrent symptoms that include re-experiencing of the event (for example, in flashbacks or nightmares), the numbing of general responsiveness, and hyper-arousal to certain stimuli that evoke associations with the event.
While unrepresentable and incommunicable, the ‘experience’ of trauma is held to find displaced expression not only in these psycho-somatic symptoms but also in forms of testimony and other cultural representations in literature, film, art and the media. ‘Trauma analysis’ of such representations in the Humanities has tended to take its lead from Caruth’s oft-quoted argument that trauma is ‘more than a pathology or a simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available’. Manifesting in this way an ‘impossible history’ that ‘they cannot entirely possess’, utterances of the traumatised subject call for acts of listening and witnessing whereby ‘some testimony can be made to trauma’s “traceless traces”’, in an ‘act of “recovery”’ that represents traumatic experience of the event whilst ‘acknowledging the gaps and absences’ in memory and representation.

Radstone identifies a number of theoretical problems with academic discussion of trauma conducted on these terms, which tend to be overlooked when the value of trauma theory becomes taken for granted. I will focus here on three of these problems. Firstly, in understanding the ‘wound’ of trauma to be caused by an extraordinary event, trauma theory proposes a model of the traumatised subject that reintroduces into the Humanities a distinction between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’: ‘One has either been present at or has “been” traumatized by a terrible event or one has not.’ This dichotomy runs counter both to a fundamental tenet of psychoanalytic thinking that rejects these categories and understands forms of psychic disturbance as a continuum, and to the model developed in cultural theory of the ‘de-centred subject ... engaged in processes of (fear), desire and meaning-making over which it lack(s) full conscious control’. Secondly, in ascribing the sole cause of trauma to an event in the external world, the significance of its mediation in the internal world and the meanings conferred on it by the subject afterwards is evaded: this is to ‘attribute all badness to the world outside’ at the expense of recognising, for example, aggression and violence within the subject. Thirdly, the emphasis placed by trauma theory on ‘the role of the listener or witness in the bringing to consciousness of previously unassimilated memory’ is doubly problematic: it contradicts another of its central tenets, namely the neuroscientific pathology of dissociation that happens to a ‘passive victim’, whilst also inscribing a privileged position and role to the trained cultural analyst. It is this analyst who is invested by trauma theory with the authority to identify and select for critical attention those cultural texts ‘that are most likely to reveal trauma’s absent traces’, to exercise empathy in discerning what is unspeakable in those texts, and to interpret their wider significance. This is to abandon the emphasis placed by cultural studies on ‘the
situated, local and multiple readings of historically specific readers and audiences’, thereby avoiding questions of ‘for whom, when, where and in what circumstances are particular texts read or experienced as trauma texts?’ Trauma criticism, concludes Radstone, ‘arguably constructs and polices the boundary of what can be recognised as trauma’.

Trauma theory derived from the medical discourses of PTSD and neuroscience, often in productive combination with other theoretical frameworks, has been taken up in Irish Studies and underpins a valuable body of scholarship on memory and the Irish past, including the Troubles. In her Introduction to Memory Ireland: The Famine and the Troubles, for example, Oona Frawley quotes Caruth to ground the volume’s framing argument that, ‘since the traumatic event is not experienced as it occurs’, trauma disrupts but also stimulates the desire to shape linear temporal meaning of the event in narrative. Tracing the shift in interest stimulated by trauma theory, from individual to ‘collective experience of trauma’, Frawley identifies the initial application of this idea to the legacies of the Great Famine, and ‘ways in which it is possible to move forward and let go of that perceived trauma through representation and commemoration, in the context of its 150th anniversary in the mid 1990s. Subsequently this same model has been applied to the recent history and living memory of the Troubles. Stefanie Lehner, for example, uses Caruth, Felman and Laub – together with Jennifer Edkins’ work on the political implications of trauma theory and Berber Bevernage’s concept of ‘irrevocable time’ (referring to ‘a “haunting” past that ‘got “stuck” and persists into the present’) to ‘expose the troubled position that the traumatic past occupies in present Northern Ireland’. Lehner’s argument is developed through analysis of two novels produced following the ceasefires of 1994 and explores in Caruthian terms ‘(l)iterature’s potential to make “unthought knowledge” ... and the “unclaimed experience” of trauma ... available and indirectly accessible to us as readers’ in encodings that ‘enable an empathic witnessing’. Fionna Barber makes similar use of Caruth to ground her study of art practice in Northern Ireland before and after the Belfast Agreement of 1998.

Generative and subtle as such analyses have often been, they are vulnerable to Radstone’s critique of the trauma theory underpinning them, for its inherent pathologising of the subject as traumatised under the impact of a determining external event, which has been selected and interpreted as such by cultural analysts trained in deciphering its unspeakable effects. Moreover, in applying a singular Caruthian model to very different historical contexts and cultural practices, the specificity of events and their ‘wounding’ effects upon meaning and subjectivity
tend to be reduced to so many instances of ‘Ireland’s traumatic past’. A further inherent problem, identified by some working within this paradigm, concerns how ‘collective trauma’, held to affect entire communities or nations and to have transgenerational impact, might be conceptualised ‘while avoiding the danger of ascribing to that group a collective psyche ... as if it were like an individual’.27

A second orthodox discourse of trauma has flourished in policy and practice concerning provision of support for victims of Troubles-related violence. Originating in an expansion of services for increasing numbers of people seeking professional help in the early years of peace process, the idea of ‘conflict-related trauma’28 was promoted by a wide range of organisations in civil society and a conventional view became mainstream in public debate. This was institutionalised by the British Government’s victims strategy from 1998 (subsequently continued under the devolved administration from 2007), involving the construction of an infrastructure to implement policy and channel significant sums of public money into PTSD counselling and other services offered by the statutory and voluntary sectors and grassroots victims’ organisations.29 Chris Gilligan identifies the underlying assumptions of this conventional view stemming from the medical model of PTSD: that ‘an event, or events, in the past causes the symptoms in the present’;30 that ‘trauma is created by conflict, but more likely to be manifested in a period of peace’;31 and that the provision of public services offering treatment for trauma in the post-conflict present furthers the restoration of psychological healing whilst also addressing the ‘psychosocial dimensions’ of peace-building, thereby enabling both traumatized individuals and the wider society to move on from the past.32

The normative temporality implicit in what Allan Young calls the ‘architecture of traumatic time’,33 envisaged as a binary, linear relation between past and present, is particularly problematic in the context of ‘transitional’ societies like Northern Ireland. When causation and ‘healing’ of suffering are mapped too neatly onto a simplistic view of ‘war as bad and peace as good’ for mental health,34 more complex temporalities are obscured; as when time flows backwards from disturbing experiences in the present to past events, illustrated by the question asked post-Agreement by retired RUC officers, ‘What was it all for?’35 For Brandon Hamber, alignment of the recovery of victims of violence with the politics of peace-building fails to recognise how individual experience may be ‘out of sync’ with what is happening collectively, and be ““moving” at a different pace”.36 This gives rise to ‘political and social pressure upon victims to remain “in step” with the national or political process’ and demands that they ‘move ... forward’ in their psychological healing through what is termed ‘closure’.37
The associated ‘medicalisation’ of distress is especially pernicious in a context of political violence since it ‘pathologises a social phenomenon’. Those diagnosed as suffering from PTSD are constructed as ‘passive victims overwhelmed by their experiences in the past’ and offered a therapeutic solution that avoids, and displaces attention from, political considerations of responsibility for violence, of justice, and of overcoming divisions in the making of an agreed future society. Hamber argues that the ‘concept (of) trauma and PTSD specifically, drives thinking towards homogeneity, as if all experiences of violence have the same outcome or need the same treatment’. In Northern Ireland as in other ‘post-conflict’ societies, the discourse of trauma works performatively ‘to change the personal and local language of suffering; that is, victims start to express themselves in medical language (“I am suffering from PTSD”) rather than express how they really feel’. According to Gilligan, the professionalisation of care associated with PTSD undermines the ‘informal social support networks’ grounded in ‘protective community bonds’ that previously provided adaptive resources to deal with and absorb the effects of violence; and sustained what might now be described as resilience. Hamber calls instead for close attention to ‘the context of violence (and) its cultural specificities’, including the ways political violence works to alter and destroy existing ‘individual and community meaning systems’ as well as social bonds and relations. Understanding the ‘distinctive political, social and cultural meanings, and, thus, specific impacts’ of ‘different violent and political incidents’ is therefore essential. This requires recognition of those affected as ‘active agents who are involved in giving meaning to their experiences’ and engaging in forms of ‘social action’ in pursuit of their own goals according to their own articulated needs and desires.

A third area of activity engaged with trauma in the context of the Northern Ireland Troubles and the peace process concerns practices of popular and grassroots storytelling. These have flourished in post-ceasefires Northern Ireland in close proximity to public debate and politics about dealing with the ‘legacies’ of the conflict in terms of truth, justice and reconciliation. An orthodoxy has emerged here too, in the notion of the ‘healing’ potential of storytelling in relation to the trauma of a still-present past. Derived from the discourse of ‘healing is revealing’ which emerged in debates surrounding the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the mid 1990s, this was taken up in Northern Ireland notably by the Healing Through Remembering (HTR) organisation formed in 2001. In its wide consultation about how people could best ‘remember the events connected with the conflict ... and in so doing, individually and collectively contribute to the healing of the wounds of society’,
HTR discovered popular support for the idea that those telling their stories, ‘if listened to empathically could experience a degree of healing’; as well as concerns that ‘recounting painful experiences could ... “reopen old wounds”’.50 This discourse influenced the subsequent development of storytelling practices and ‘the recording of trauma memories from conflict’.51 For example, the film-maker and founder of the Prisons Memory Archive, Cahal McLaughlin, while sensibly cautious about ‘claim(ing) any healing potential’ for his own films, has situated his practice in relation to a range of critical writing on trauma and ‘reparative memory’ which includes that of Caruth and Laub.52 It has also found its way into policy formulations on ‘dealing with the past’, such as the Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, which recommends storytelling as ‘a process designed to facilitate individual and societal healing and to break the cycle of conflict’.53

Running through these debates, and widely deployed in media reportage and popular understandings of traumatic experience, is another conventional assumption: that of ‘closure’. The desire for closure, in the sense of a wished for ending to emotional distress, is routinely expressed by those harmed by political violence, whether sought through storytelling or, alternatively, through campaigning for truth and justice in unresolved cases of killing from the conflict.54 In the words of Gillian Grigg of the War Widows’ Association of Great Britain, in her evidence to the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in 2005: ‘While you have unfinished business, whatever it happens to be, to do with what happened, then you cannot have closure; you cannot completely move forward; you cannot take a second new life.’55 This vocabulary of closure contradictorily echoes both exhortations to victims to keep ‘in step’ with the requirements of peace-building, and concerns about the difficulties encountered in attempts to ‘move forward and let go of’ a traumatic past. The popularity and concomitant instability of this idea of closure signals a set of issues concerning emotional and affective experience and how it is lived, handled and potentially transformed, that the PTSD paradigm – with its emphasis on linear temporality and a clear demarcation between past and present on one hand, and its homogenizing tendencies on the other – is ill-equipped to address.

From trauma to feeling and emotion in history: shifting the frame
Running through critiques of trauma theory and practice grounded on the diagnostic of PTSD and ideas from neuroscience is a set of concerns about its lack of detailed attention to the substance of ‘traumatic experience’ (if indeed we can so name a condition that is by definition ‘unexperienced’) involving a range of human feelings and emotions as these are embodied and made meaningful within specific historical
cultures. In this second part of the article, I advocate making a shift in the analytical framework we use to think about the affective legacies of the Irish Troubles and their relation to ‘post-conflict’ activity to ‘come to terms with’ or ‘deal with the past’ in the Irish peace process, away from trauma and towards the domain of emotion, feeling and affect in history.

To open up this kind of enquiry is to move beyond the particular framing emphases and circumscriptions of trauma, in four main ways. Firstly, freed from trauma’s focus on pathological affective states implicitly counterposed to an ‘untraumatic’ norm, more inclusive consideration could be given to emotions and feelings in times of war, conflict and political violence, utilising more open, less rigid categorisations of what these consist in, what they mean, and how they work within historically specific cultures that pre-exist and continue after violent events. Secondly, moving beyond explanations of the effects of violent conflict on emotional life that reduce this to external causation by ‘the event’, richer, more complex and nuanced accounts of the relation between external and internal worlds are required. These would enable emotional experience to be considered not only as a wound crying out, but as the medium for a range of interactions as well as ‘disconnects’ between historical subjectivities and socio-cultural worlds consisting not only of events but also of frameworks of meaning. Thirdly, by acknowledging the active engagement of those affected by ‘trauma’ in making sense of and representing their own emotional experiences, work on the interpretation of states of feeling need no longer be restricted to analysis undertaken by professional authorities (the cultural critic, the trauma counsellor, the academic historian), but would seek understanding of how emotional life within a society is recognized and ‘felt’ by situated individuals and social groups. Critical enquiry could then focus its attention on ‘the real feelings and desires of actual victims’ – or, to avoid the exclusive and politicized connotations attached to this term in Northern Ireland, of those who have been subjected to, or harmed by, or engaged in political violence (or all of these) – when freed from hegemonic silencing and the pressure to represent themselves as trauma victims. Fourthly, abandoning linear conceptions of temporality and socio-political imperatives for ‘premature closure’ points to the need for investigations of the complex temporalities of emotion and feeling within structures of power, compliance and resistance; and of the activisms that seek transformation of conflict-related emotions through future-oriented efforts ‘to change social reality, forge new connections and align inner reality with what is happening externally’.

In my thinking about these issues, I am finding resources for a new analytical framework in three areas of investigation which propose distinct though in certain
respects overlapping approaches. These are the tradition of object-relations psychoanalytic theory derived from the work of Melanie Klein and associated in the UK with the Tavistock Institute in London, cultural materialist analysis centred on Raymond Williams’ conception of ‘structures of feeling’, and work developed since the turn of the century on emotional histories. In what follows I discuss each in turn.

Object-relations theory ‘holds out a perspective for the construction of a psychoanalysis that takes account of social relations’, and demonstrates ‘a potential willingness to investigate psychic life in terms of the particularity of (actual) social relationships ... located historically within a specific culture’. Embodied emotional and psychic life is understood as a dynamic process occurring within a person’s inner world, largely unconscious, peopled by imagined objects or ‘imagos’ with which the self interacts to establish various kinds of internal object relations. These imagined objects partly derive their character from, but also affect perceptions of, external others and social situations, which are experienced according to internal psychic reality. Expressions of feeling, behaviours and relationships in the social world thus become vehicles for ‘acting out’ internal object relations, managing internal disturbances and conflicts, and controlling or managing emotions.

This kind of psychoanalytic thinking offers more dynamic conceptions of the emotional substance of psychic and social life than those found in conventional trauma theory. Indeed, much of the critique presented earlier in this article is informed by this tradition. In making her argument that ‘the traumatization effect does not appear to reside in the nature of the event ... but (in) what the mind later does to memory’, Radstone quotes the object-relations psychoanalyst, Caroline Garland:

Whatever the nature of the event ... eventually (the survivor) comes to make sense of it in terms of the most troubled and troubling of the relationships between the objects that are felt to inhabit his internal world. That way the survivor is at least making something recognisable and familiar out of the extraordinary, giving it a meaning (original ellipsis).

Hamber’s thinking about extreme political violence, trauma, and victimhood is also rooted in object-relations theory derived from his training as a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist, as this encountered a ‘tidal wave of emotion’ in local meetings with victims of apartheid-era violence whilst preparing for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995. The object-relations model complements and may be integrated into cultural and historical approaches to feeling and emotion, and opens up ways of thinking that understand these phenomena as a medium through
which the interconnections between internal and external worlds are produced, regulated, contested and transformed.

Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism is also centrally concerned with the agency of historically-situated people in the making of meanings, the articulation of the felt texture of personal and social experience, and the challenging of received understandings and dominant frameworks for making sense. Williams proposes the concept ‘structures of feeling’ to think about ‘meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs’ – relations which may range from assent or dissent to more complex interactions and negotiations. It draws attention to what he calls ‘characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: ... thought as felt and feeling as thought’, often ‘at the very edge’ of ‘practical consciousness' and not yet fully recognised or articulated within existing frameworks of understanding. For Williams, ‘this felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time’ is the medium of a ‘community of experience’ linking those who share a class position and belong to a generation. It is hard to pin down and study, especially ‘(o)nce the carriers of such a structure die’. But what Williams calls these ‘social experiences in solution’ can be discerned in the ‘precipitated’ form of cultural representations, the stories and images that we make of our lived experience. Williams here identifies a gap between lived experience and its representation, and invites further reflection on how this is mediated and how emotions ‘in solution’ might be accessed. Critical attention can then focus on the quality of the precipitating voices, the forms they create to articulate ‘embryonic’ or ‘emergent’ new structures of feeling, with their limitations and achievements, and the social positions from which they speak.

As Harding and Pribram have argued, Williams’ concept brings the emotions into focus ‘as rich, complex sociocultural practices' that are ‘culturally constituted and culturally shared’, with ascertainable effects; and enables us to ask ‘what new or changing formations of emotion has it become possible to think or feel at a given moment?’ According to in their useful critique, these possibilities are limited by Williams’ tendency to homogenize ‘vast singular structures of feeling reflecting unified configurations of subject positions – class or generational – at a particular historical moment or location’, and an insufficiently developed sense of ‘conflict, competition or struggle between the structures of feeling of any epoch’. Revised, as they suggest, to refer to ‘a multiplicity of structures of feeling that operate in a complex interactive web' that is ‘interactional ... (and) historically changing’, ‘structures of feeling’ provides a valuable conceptual basis for analysing the
configuration of felt experiences that manifested in Northern Ireland in response to
the violence of the Troubles, and the shifts that have occurred ‘post-conflict’. These
include the emergence of social interest in trauma, therapy and healing, and also
how the so-called ceasefire generation post-1994 has ‘respond(ed) in its own ways
to the world ... feeling its whole life in certain ways differently, and shaping its
creative response into a new structure of feeling’.75

More variegated accounts of the contingency, context and social dynamics of
feeling can be found in recent studies of the history and politics of emotion, including work
that is directly concerned with emotional life in times of war and conflict. While
emphasising emotional life as a cultural and social phenomenon, historians of emotion
have to confront its intersection with the felt energies and affects arising in what Joanna
Bourke terms ‘the emotional body’,76 evident in the ‘fight or flight’ reactions to fear arising
in combat situations,77 and in the prevalence of stomach aches and upsets amongst
soldiers on the Western Front during the First World War identified by Michael Roper.78
However, caught in a tension between embodiment and signification, our own affective
experience is not self-evident and transparent but requires ‘emotional labour’ to
understand and interpret what goes on inside, in the internal world, at the ‘boundaries
between “bodily space” and social space’”.79 We discover, reflect on, and may attempt to
articulate, what it is that we feel on the basis of a ‘vocabulary of emotion’.80 These words
have, as the much-quoted anthropologist William Reddy puts it, a ‘unique capacity to alter
what they “refer” to or what they “represent”; so, for example, ‘the sensation of fear’ may
be conjured, or altered, by ‘acts of speaking (or writing) one’s fear’.81 ‘As the words
change, so too does the meaning of the emotion within a particular culture’.82

The prevailing languages of emotion are imbricated with social norms and what
Claire Langhamer calls ‘dominant emotional codes and standards’, which also form and
shift historically in relation to changing conditions of life.83 For Barbara Rosenwein,
‘emotions have social functions and follow social rules’, providing ‘tools with which we
manage social life’ and conduct our relations with others.84 She proposes the concept of
‘emotional communities’ to refer to the ‘systems of feeling’ that are active within social
institutions and networks – ‘families, neighbourhoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries,
parish church (congregations)’ – and which establish ‘what these communities (and the
individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations
that they make about others’ emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people
that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage,
tolerate and deplore’.85 Rosenwein argues that multiple emotional communities jostle and
overlap within a society at any particular historical moment, constituting conflicting and
sometimes contradictory common sense about the meaning and value of an emotion such
as hatred;\textsuperscript{86} and that ‘people move (and moved) continually from one such community to another’, adjusting their emotional expression accordingly.\textsuperscript{87} This can be seen in Roper’s analysis of the emotional survival skills that soldiers exercised during the First World War, which demonstrates how ‘models of care’ derived from their ‘closest emotional bonds’ within the family, particularly between mothers and sons, provided soldiers with ‘emotional reference points’ to draw on in their relationships within the institution of the Army at the front.\textsuperscript{88} In an analysis that suggests how we might think concretely about Gilligan’s ‘informal support networks’ and the resilience of those affected by the violence of the Troubles, Roper explores how soldiers tried to ‘keep their spirits up’, took care of each other, and coped with ‘emotions like fear, anger, love and loss’, which were shaped ‘according to particular class and family cultures and idioms of expression’.\textsuperscript{89}

In handling feelings such as loss or love within social life, then, while we ‘exercise ... emotional agency’, we are not free agents.\textsuperscript{90} Rather, we situate our own feelings in relation to cultures – or ‘structures of feeling’, used by both Rosenwein and Roper\textsuperscript{91} – that shape patterns, expectations and models of experience. Emotional communities and cultures with specific locations in time and space develop particular ways of organising felt subjectivity, enabling us to recognise and communicate our emotional lives and interactions. On this basis our emotions are felt to be validated by, or to be transgressive of, cultural norms and values. Thus they have political implications. Handled in culturally sanctioned ways according to ‘feeling-rules’ that govern their expression or concealment, emotions are subject to repression, restraint and sanctioned release.\textsuperscript{92} The gendering of such rules is demonstrated in Lucy Noakes’ study of ‘the management of female grief’ in anticipation of, and response to, air raids on Britain during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{93} This explores how a long-established ‘emotional economy ... emphasiz(ing) stoicism and reticence’ as the ‘(desirable) codes of behaviour’ for men was extended to women as a means of curtailing the ‘disruptive’ and ‘destabiliz(ing)’ impact of mass bereavement on national morale and the war effort.\textsuperscript{94} In wartime British culture, the requirements of emotional restraint, whether internally adopted through engagement with popular cultural texts or externally imposed by national and local state authorities, policed public expressions of emotion whilst constituting the private sphere as the location of greater licence, and responsibility, in emotional life. However, the negotiation of felt experience between people and social institutions is never only about emotional control, but also involves the social and political ‘evoking’ of emotion, as in the case of fear, which Bourke shows to have been incited historically in relation to shifting social anxieties from the afterlife of hell to terrorism.\textsuperscript{95}

Emotions may be felt collectively, even contagiously, by people in social groups undergoing a common experience, including those recognized as a ‘traumatized
community'; and such collectivities themselves become the object of emotional management, as in official strategies for avoiding panic in crowd control. Yet varied and unexpected emotional reactions also arise within groups, which are never homogeneous; as can be seen in the diverse expressions of happiness, fortitude, and a sense of reassurance perversely derived from the recognition that other people are also worried, reported in response to the danger of bombings during the Blitz. This leads Bourke to conclude that, far from belonging to any pre-given collective entity such as a class, emotions work to ‘align people with others’, thereby constituting them as a social group (and, as Sara Ahmed argues, organising their felt relation to others); so ‘fear places people’, sorting them into positions within a social hierarchy. The question for historians of emotion, then, is ‘what is (an emotion such as) fear doing?’ Applying this argument to Northern Ireland since the Troubles, Bourke suggests that the ‘invention of trauma society’ has ‘framed, created and managed extremes of anxiety’ at the cost of recognizing people’s resilience, creativity and courage. ‘The issue’, Bourke concludes, ‘is not whether we are traumatised, but how we are transformed’. This suggests other ways of thinking about the temporality of emotions and the meaning of ‘moving on’.

Historians of emotion offer complex models of emotional life and temporality, sensitive to what I have called the ‘afterlife’ of emotion and the ways in which feelings ‘live on’ and move dynamically in time. In one sense, following the temporal architecture of conventional trauma theory, emotion and affect can be seen as the product of an originating event or episode such as violent conflict ‘in the past’. Emotions of various kinds come to be experienced and understood as something caused by and attached to this event. According to one kind of account, this emotion then persists continuously after the event into the present, where it is always ready to be given expression again; as, for example, in Freud’s thinking about melancholy as persistent loss. Another kind of account sees the emotional and affective response to the event becoming overlaid by subsequent emotional experience and development, such that it becomes progressively distanced in time while retaining potential to be reconnected to the present. This can be seen in the phenomenon of ‘return’ to, and re-experiencing of, a disturbing event which has not been psychically ‘absorbed’ or ‘digested’ at the time of its occurrence but remains in the unconscious as a ‘trace’ – what Roper calls ‘emotional residues’ – capable of ‘animating later recollections’. Eva Hoffman, writing of the ‘transmission of loss across generations’ after the Holocaust, describes a form of knowledge that is ‘not a memory’ but ‘states of feeling conveyed by survivors to their offspring’. ‘What we children of survivors knew .. were the emotional sequelae of our elders’ experiences’; ‘affective messages’ communicated ‘by some means’, such that ‘children speak of being permeated by
sensations of panic and deadliness, of shame and guilt’, conveying an ‘imperative to perform impossible psychic tasks’ of rescue and reparation’.107

Even if temporally located ‘in the past’, then, emotions are durational and involve complex relations between past, present and future. Their temporality may be fluid rather than fixed once and for all, and characterised in various ways; as longevity, but also as capacities for recurrence, re-emergence, ebb and flow’, repetition. Further complications stem from the mutability of affect and emotion, and what Bourke calls its ‘fluctuations in intensity over time’.108 One emotion or affective state may also transform into another – such as sadness into anger, or anger into guilt – and these may condense together into compound formations like those found in Derry/Londonderry after the Bloody Sunday shootings.109 This points to the way that emotion and affect can be considered according to a second kind of temporality, as produced and expressed, lived and handled in the context of circumstances and concerns of a present moment. Much of the work on memory and subjectivity undertaken within oral history and life-history analysis has emphasised the making of new meanings, namings and interpretations of experience, including states of feeling, that subjects produce retrospectively, possibly many years later. Making sense of past events in new ways may transform what is felt about them now, as Nicola King argues in her take on Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, translated as ‘afterwardsness’.110 The oral historian Alistair Thomson captures the dynamics of temporality within the ordinary life course, and the way life transitions associated with the process of ageing and looking back over time may trigger a re-evaluation of feelings long attached to past events, in his phrase ‘experience never ends’.111

Work on the history of emotions is also opening up the significance of futurity in constituting feelings in the present. In her work on the history of love, Claire Langhamer understands emotional life in Britain during the Second World War in terms of a temporal break in those ‘normal’ patterns and expectations of courtship, engagement and marriage that traditionally gave meaning and value to sexual attractions as well as criteria for evaluating and choosing sexual partners and behaviours, founded on the projection and planning of a shared trajectory of life in the future. Amid the fears and uncertainties of wartime, permeated by the ‘feeling you might be gone tomorrow’, confidence in any imaginable future was shattered.112 This produced a new emotional ethos of ‘living for the moment’ and fostered desire for short-term relationships and hasty marriages grounded on immediate gratification rather than long-term commitment; for, as one female Mass-Observer remarked in 1942, when a ‘man’s mind is so uncertain of its future he cannot in fairness to himself or another undertake a tie of permanence ... the only thing to do so long as the war continues is to live for the present only, and evade ties so deep that their destruction would destroy as well one’s stability’.113 Such considerations of futurity open
up further questions, about how subjective composure organised within a short-term temporal horizon of this kind is interpreted and evaluated subsequently as one looks back having ‘cross(ed) into a new temporal space’ of the postwar with its ‘radical reorientation of the present’.114

Conclusion
I have argued in this article that historical approaches to the phenomena of feeling and emotion, especially those concerned with war and conflict, open up new perspectives on emotional life that move beyond the frame of trauma and avoid some of its difficulties. These approaches offer a number of productive concepts for understanding the social dynamics and temporalities of lived experience and memory and its representation during and after the Troubles, and suggest new kinds of orientation towards, for example, the storytelling and life history projects and archives that have flourished during the peace process. As well as informing what it is that such projects explore, by seeing their work as a production of emotional histories richer use could be made of the stories they elicit and collect, as sources for investigating structures of feeling and the meanings that are being made and remade of emotional life over a fifty-year period since the onset of the conflict.115 With a new horizon of the future now opened up by the UK’s ‘Brexit’ vote to leave the European Union, posing the threat of a restored ‘hard border’ in Ireland that reawakens emotions ‘of the past’, historical approaches to the social dynamics and afterlife of emotion and feeling in memory offer tools for understanding the present that are more specific, flexible, multifaceted and complex than those offered by Caruthian trauma theory.

This is not to advocate ‘history’ at the expense of ‘psychology’, and I want to end by arguing for the retention of a psychoanalytic dimension to the investigation of emotional histories, rooted in the object-relations tradition. Feelings and emotions are, as the social historian Michael Roper puts it, ‘always relational’,116 in that they arise and make themselves felt in relation to others, both real and imagined, and are mediated, in psychoanalytic terms, through internal object relations that figure modes of intersubjectivity and colour with feeling our social and political relationships. For object-relations theorists, recovery from deeply disturbing experience and the nurturing of psychic health depends upon capacities for ‘reparation’ being mobilized to think about the meanings and emotions attached to internal objects, to undo defensive splitting within the psyche, and to integrate contradictory emotions and conflicting aspects of the self within a less polarized inner world. The work of reparation is strengthened by the ‘introjection’, or taking in, of such capacities where
they are encountered in social life. This, as well as the perception of discrepancies between anticipations derived from the internal world and the complex realities of the external social world, enables 'something new to happen' within both psychic and social reality.¹¹⁷

Work by historians of emotion has already begun to explore how concepts and insights from object relations theory may be used in historical interpretation of emotional formations and dynamics; as in my previous thinking about 'reparative remembering' as a means of undoing 'defensive' modes of subjective composure of the self, and in Roper's reading of soldiers' writing as a means to 'get rid of disturbing feelings' or as attempts at 'containing' otherwise 'nameless dread'.¹¹⁸ There is scope for further work of this kind, to explore how emotional transformations in self and society are brought about after war and conflict, and to illuminate the complex and challenging meanings of 'moving on'.

Notes
² Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.10.
⁵ Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.12.
⁸ Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.15.
⁹ Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.4.
¹⁰ Caruth, Trauma, p.5.
¹¹ Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.20.
¹² Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.17.
¹⁴ Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.18.
17 Radstone, 'Trauma Theory', p.22.

20 The wider range of debate on trauma in Irish Studies is beyond the scope of this article, but see Dawson, MPWP, where the PTSD paradigm is married (uneasily) with an object-relations psychoanalytic approach to trauma; Joseph Valente, 'Ethnonostalgia: Irish Hunger and Traumatic Memory', in Memory Ireland, Volume 3: The Famine and the Troubles, ed. Oona Frawley (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2014), pp.174-92, who argues that in work on the Irish Famine, the Caruthian dissociation model has been less influential than the Freudian model of repression producing amnesia; Emilie Pine, The Politics of Irish Memory: Performing Remembrance in Irish Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), where the concept of trauma is detached from its psychological roots and used to signify cultural constructions of the past in terms of unresolved pain and suffering; and the range of contributions to The Body in Pain in Irish Literature and Culture, eds. Fionnuala Dillane, Naomi McAleavey and Emilie Pine (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).
21 Oona Frawley, Introduction, Memory Ireland, pp.1-14 (7).
22 Frawley, Introduction, p.11.


27 Dawson, MPWP, p.62.

30 Gilligan, p.329.
31 Gilligan, p.327.
32 Gilligan, pp.326, 336.
33 Quoted in Gilligan, p.329.
34 Gilligan, p.327.

38 Hamber, Dealing with Painful Memories, p.4.
40 Hamber, Dealing with Painful Memories, p.4.
42 Gilligan, p. 328.
43 Hamber, *Dealing with Painful Memories*, p.4.
44 Hamber, *Dealing with Painful Memories*, p.4.
46 Hamber, *Dealing with Painful Memories*, p.5.
47 Gilligan, p.330.
52 McLaughlin, *Recording Memories*, p.21.
62 Quoted in Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory’, p.17.
69 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, pp.133-34
70 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, pp.131,134.
81 Bourke, *Fear*, p.287.
82 Bourke, *Fear*, p.75.
84 Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about Emotions’, pp.841, 842.
87 Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about Emotions’, p.842.
91 Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about Emotions’, p.839 note 68; Roper, *Secret Battle*, p.188.
94 Noakes, ‘Gender, Grief and Bereavement’, pp.77, 74.
97 Bourke, *Fear*, pp.228-32.
100 Bourke, *Fear*, p.353.
102 Bourke, *Fear*, p.382.
103 This section draws on Graham Dawson, ‘Memory, ‘Post-Conflict’ Temporalities and the Afterlife of Emotion in Conflict Transformation after the Irish Troubles’, in *Irish Studies and the Dynamics of*
Memory, eds. Marguérite Corporaal, Christopher Cusack and Ruud van den Beuken (Oxford: Peter Lang, forthcoming).


108 Bourke, Fear, p.150.

109 Dawson, MPWP, pp. 139-41.


118 Dawson, MPWP, pp.77, 311-12; Roper, Secret Battle, pp. 68, 250.